10/16/2021 0 Comments Passcode For Mac Everytime I Close It
My only recommendation is to simply close the window to continue with your work.1. Another Mac that I use that is running Sierra has the same problem. #1582: iOS 15.0.1 and iPadOS 15.0.1, Apple Watch Series 7 dates, cautionary tale about backups, using Live Text and Safari extensionsIt went away when I clicked CANCEL which shows that it is not really doing anything other than annoy. But the problem surfaces, when you are asked for a password to enter the home screen, and the worst case scenario is that you are asked for it every time it goes to the sleep mode and you don’t know the password at all. It automatically goes to Sleep mode. One such difficulty arises, when you leave your Mac OS X device undisturbed for some time.
![]() Passcode Everytime I Close It Mac OS X DeviceThis password protects your Apple ID, saved passwords, and other data stored in iCloud. Enter the password you use to unlock the Mac ‘ name here’. #1578: Apple delays CSAM detection, upgrade Quicken 2007 to Quicken Deluxe, App Store settlement and regulatory changesWhy Apple Asks for Your Passcode or Password with a New Login (and Why It’s Safe)If you’ve set up or restored an Apple device recently and have two-factor authentication enabled on your Apple ID, you may have seen a message during configuration that defies your understanding of how Apple maintains device privacy and account security.The message reads something like, “Enter Mac Password. Download kodi 187 leia for androidNow I’ve figured out what is going on by reviewing Apple’s documentation and deducing the missing pieces. (It has a new, shorter title in this release, and is already updated for iOS 13.1—check it out if you’re looking for more information about iOS networking, privacy, and security.)While I had heard of this prompt happening once last year, I had never seen it myself. I had to take a photo of this unusual login screen, as it was during setup and screen capture wasn’t available.Doesn’t this seem contradictory, confusing, and just plain wrong? Why would Apple ask for the password or passcode for one of your other devices? Could it be some sort of scam? What exactly is going on here?I encountered this issue, as did Take Control publisher Joe Kissell, in preparing the iOS 13 and iPadOS 13 revision to my long-running networking and security book, Connect and Secure Your iPhone and iPad. Some of it is available in decrypted form if you were to access it via iCloud.com. ICloud Stores Two Kinds of Secured Data for YouAll the data that’s synced between your devices via iCloud is encrypted while in transit (generally using HTTPS) and at rest on Apple’s servers. But it’s not sufficiently detailed—that would require screens of text—to explain what’s going on. There are many kinds of phishing attacks, one severe type of which involves obtaining fraudulently issued HTTPS certificates that can have all the trappings of a legitimate and secure site.The attacker could then simply use your login name and password to initiate an attempt to log in to iCloud, even triggering Apple to send you an extra login token used for two-factor authentication, which, if you entered it on the phishing site, could be used by the attacker at iCloud.Apple users have been phished, of course, although as far as I know, Apple has never suffered from a fraudulent certificate attack. Phishing requires only that an attacker fools someone into thinking they are entering their credentials into a legitimate site that is, instead, a man-in-the-middle. It’s extremely unlikely, but it’s not strictly impossible.This data could also be at risk in a successful phishing attack. In very rare circumstances, someone who compromised Apple’s keys or server security could extract that iCloud.com-accessible information from a transmission or from iCloud. There are also likely other bits of data that facilitate device-to-device interactions.As a result, you cannot view these categories of data at iCloud.com, only using your devices. Instead, those keys reside only on individual iPhones, iPads, and Macs.There’s a full list of end-to-end encrypted services at Apple’s iCloud security overview page they include iCloud Keychain, Screen Time information, Health data, Wi-Fi passwords, the People album in Photos, and the new Find My service’s crowdsourced location information. Apple doesn’t possess any of the keys required to decrypt this data passing through its servers. Since then, certificate-issuing and -tracking procedures and the way browsers check for legitimately issued documents have substantially reduced but not eliminated that particular risk.Because of phishing risks, Apple has chosen to protect some data that it views as highly secure or very private with end-to-end encryption that prevents Apple from knowing anything about the contents of the synced data. ![]() Devices in the user’s sync set, including newly enrolled hardware, sync by exchanging metadata information. The devices never reveal their private keys and have the public keys of all the other devices connected to an iCloud account.The data protected in this way is stored as individual packages—for example, a URL, account name, and password as a single unit—and identified with random metadata that’s meaningless except to establish a unique ID for each data package. For iCloud Keychain and similar sensitive data, Apple has your devices generate and maintain a set of public and private keys that enable interaction with the information synced across iCloud. An Extra Element to Protect against InterceptionApple’s iOS 12 security white paper explains this system in some depth, noting that your iCloud Apple ID account password by itself can be used to enroll a new device. To understand how that works, we need to understand the role of your iCloud password. Rather, it comes when you want to add a new device to this set. This approach is both typical and sensible.The hard part isn’t syncing data privately. The Mac encrypts the login entry with the public key of the iPhone, which receives it via iCloud sync, and then decrypts it with its private key. In this case, it’s something you create or Apple creates for you on one device and that you enter on another.(Never heard of an iCloud Security Code? You’re not alone! It’s barely mentioned on Apple’s site, and Apple’s white paper doesn’t discuss the code deeply. Out-of-band elements are a common way to block data hijacking by requiring a secret that has never been put online. (This is also used for a lot of data stored in a Secure Enclave, like your passcode.)You could enable an iCloud Security Code as an “out-of-band” element—something that is never transmitted by the same means as other data. Whenever you enter your password, it’s run through a one-way encryption algorithm that performs a vast number of mathematical operations—the process is called “hashing”—that makes it effectively impossible to determine the original password. Instead, it stores only an encrypted form of the password. It may not be robust enough to match Apple’s current security and authentication requirements.As for the iCloud password, it suffers from a different set of concerns. It was also created when iCloud Keychain was the only set of data Apple secured end-to-end and synced via iCloud, and before both two-step verification and the later two-factor authentication for Apple ID. The iCloud Security Code is yet another piece of information to remember and deal with and thus runs counter to Apple’s commitment to simplicity.
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